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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
 For the second time, Kevin Weatherspoon seeks a 
reduction in his sentence for conspiring to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute over 50 grams of cocaine 
base.  In October 2006, he pled guilty and was sentenced to a 
120-month term of imprisonment pursuant to a binding plea 
agreement with the government.  A few years later, the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive amendment 
which reduced Weatherspoon‘s Guidelines range.  We 
rejected Weatherspoon‘s first motion for a sentence reduction 
because he was sentenced pursuant to a binding plea 
agreement.  In this motion, he argues that he is nevertheless 
eligible for a reduction because under the Supreme Court‘s 
recent decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 
(2011), the sentence contained in his plea agreement was 
―based on‖ the Sentencing Guidelines.  We disagree, and we 
will affirm the District Court‘s denial of his motion.  
 
I.  
 
 In May 2005, Kevin Weatherspoon was indicted by a 
federal grand jury for crimes relating to the distribution and 
possession of cocaine, cocaine base and marijuana.  In lieu of 
trial, Weatherspoon pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base 
pursuant to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) 
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plea agreement (a ―(C) plea agreement‖).1  In that agreement, 
the parties agreed that Weatherspoon should receive a 
sentence of 120 months‘ imprisonment because that sentence 
was ―a reasonable sentence under the facts and circumstances 
of the case.‖ (Appendix (―App.‖) at 13-14.)  
 
 Weatherspoon‘s plea agreement contains only a few 
references to the Sentencing Guidelines.  The agreement does 
not expressly state what the parties believed Weatherspoon‘s 
Guidelines range would be or if they used the Guidelines to 
determine that a 120-month term of imprisonment was the 
appropriate sentence.  Nor does it provide his offense level or 
criminal history category.  
  
 The agreement does, however, note that ―[t]he 
defendant . . . agrees that any legal and factual issues relating 
to the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to the 
defendant‘s conduct, including facts that support any specific 
offense characteristic or other enhancement or adjustment and 
the appropriate sentence within the statutory maximum 
provided for by law, will be determined by the court at a 
sentencing hearing.‖  (App. at 12.)  The (C) plea agreement 
also makes certain recommendations relevant to the 
calculation of his offense level.  Specifically, the parties 
agreed that for the purposes of sentencing, the court should: 
                                              
1
 Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
permits the parties to ―agree that a specific sentence or 
sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or 
that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or 
policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply 
(such a recommendation or request binds the court once the 
court accepts the plea agreement).‖    
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(1) attribute at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms of 
cocaine base to Weatherspoon; and (2) attribute at least 500 
grams but less than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride to 
him.  Weatherspoon was also to receive a three-level 
reduction to his offense level because of his acceptance of 
responsibility.  There is no mention in the agreement of his 
use of a firearm or his role in the conspiracy.  Nor did it 
indicate that the facts mentioned in the agreement were the 
only ones relevant to the calculation of his offense level.  The 
agreement notes that his statutory maximum sentence was 20 
years‘ imprisonment.2  
 
  Weatherspoon pled guilty on October 23, 2006.  At 
his change of plea hearing, the government summarized the 
plea agreement.  The prosecutor mentioned that 
Weatherspoon faced a maximum sentence of 20 years‘ 
imprisonment but did not mention what his applicable 
Guidelines range was.  The government also noted that the 
parties agreed that Weatherspoon should receive a 120-month 
sentence, but did not indicate any basis for that determination.  
The prosecutor did mention that ―the [g]overnment and 
defense have agreed to recommend a sentence in this . . . 
agreement that will likely be somewhat lower than the actual 
guideline[s] range, and that was in consideration of his appeal 
                                              
2
 The plea agreement also contains a waiver of appeal 
provision.  We need not consider its impact here, however, 
because the government failed to raise the issue and thus it is 
waived.  See United States v. Carrasco-De-Jesus, 589 F.3d 
22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (―Where, as here, the government‘s 
relinquishment of a known right relates to a waiver-of-appeal 
provision in a plea agreement, there is usually little reason to 
disregard that election.‖) 
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waiver, his timely guilty plea, et cetera.‖ (App. at 49-50.)  
After explaining Weatherspoon‘s rights to him, the District 
Court accepted Weatherspoon‘s guilty plea.   
 
 For sentencing, the Probation Department prepared a 
pre-sentence report.  Using the 2006 edition of the Guidelines 
manual, the Probation Officer, accepting the factual 
recommendations in the plea agreement, calculated 
Weatherspoon‘s base offense level as 36.  She then added two 
additional points for Weatherspoon‘s possession of a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug offense under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), and three additional points for Weatherspoon‘s 
role as a supervisor in the organization, under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.1(b).  Finally, she subtracted three points for 
Weatherspoon‘s acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1(a), (b).  Ultimately, the Probation Officer determined 
that Weatherspoon had a total offense level of 38.  Because 
this was Weatherspoon‘s first offense, his criminal history 
category was I, corresponding to a Guidelines range of 235 to 
293 months.  Due to the statutory maximum of 20 years, 
however, the top of his Guidelines range was reduced to 240 
months.  
 
 The District Court sentenced Weatherspoon on 
February 15, 2007.  At sentencing, the District Court did not 
explicitly calculate or adopt a particular Guidelines range.  
Rather, after brief argument, it accepted the recommended 
sentence of 120 months.  It explained that in accepting that 
sentence, it took ―into consideration the presentence 
investigation report, the statements by [Weatherspoon‘s] 
lawyer and the seriousness of the charges.‖  (App. at 68.)  The 
District Court also considered the applicable § 3553(a) 
factors, particularly the ―kinds of sentences that are available, 
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and the advisory sentencing range and policies prescribed by 
the United States Sentencing Commission.‖  (App. at 68-69.)  
 
 On November 1, 2007, nine months after 
Weatherspoon‘s sentencing, the Sentencing Commission 
passed Amendment 706 to the Guidelines, which reduced the 
cocaine base equivalency.  In March 2008, the amendment 
was made retroactive.  The amendment effectively reduced 
Weatherspoon‘s total offense level from 38 to 36, resulting in 
a reduction of his Guidelines range from 235–240 months to 
188–235 months.   
 
 Shortly after, Weatherspoon filed his first motion for a 
reduction in his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which 
allows a court to reduce a defendant‘s sentence retroactively 
based on a change in the Guidelines.  Weatherspoon 
contended that since his 120-month sentence represented a 
49% reduction from the bottom of his then-Guidelines range, 
his sentence should be proportionately reduced to 96 months 
based on his new Guidelines range.  The District Court denied 
that motion, finding that his sentence was still ―comparably 
less than the amended guideline range.‖ (App. at 92.)   
 
 Weatherspoon appealed to this Court.  We held that 
Weatherspoon was ineligible for a reduction because of his 
binding plea agreement.  United States v. Weatherspoon, 338 
F. App‘x 143, 143 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. 
Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2009)).
3
  The Supreme 
                                              
3
 In Sanchez, we held that a defendant who pleads guilty 
pursuant to a (C) plea agreement receives a sentence that is 
―based on‖ the agreement and that such defendants are never 
eligible for 3582(c)(2) relief.  562 F.3d at 279-82. 
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Court denied Weatherspoon‘s petition for certiorari on 
November 30, 2009.  Weatherspoon v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 768 (2009).     
 
 Two years later, the United States Supreme Court 
issued its ruling in Freeman v. United States, --- U.S. --- , 131 
S. Ct. 2685 (2011).  A plurality of the Court held that 
defendants who pled guilty to (C) plea agreements are eligible 
for relief under § 3582(c)(2) whenever the district court uses 
the Guidelines as a basis for accepting the agreement.  Id. at 
2695.  Justice Sotomayor concurred, finding that these 
defendants are only eligible when their plea agreements make 
clear that the parties used the Guidelines as a foundation for 
the term of imprisonment set forth in the agreement.  Id. at 
2697-98.  Thus, five members of the Supreme Court 
concluded that defendants who pled guilty pursuant to (C) 
plea agreements could be eligible for relief, overruling our 
prior decision in Sanchez.   
 
Based on this change in the law, Weatherspoon filed a 
second motion for a reduction in his sentence.  The District 
Court denied that motion without reasoning and  
Weatherspoon filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
II.  
 
 When the district court determines that a defendant is 
ineligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), our review 
is plenary.  United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds, Freeman, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2685; see also United States v. Lawson, --- F.3d ---, 2012 
WL 2866265, at *1 (11th Cir. July 13, 2012).  By contrast, 
when the district court determines that a defendant is eligible 
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for relief but declines to reduce his sentence, our review is for 
an abuse of discretion.  Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 278 n.4; see also 
United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012).   
 
A district court‘s authority to alter or amend a 
defendant‘s sentence is limited.  Under the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, a district court loses any continuing 
authority over a sentence once it has been imposed, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c), subject to two general exceptions.  First, 
though not relevant here, a district court has the power to 
correct clerical or technical errors within 14 days of the entry 
of judgment.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); Fed R. Crim. P. 
35(a).  Second, a district court has the power to amend a 
sentence, provided that it was based on a Guidelines range 
that has since been lowered.  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Under 
§ 3582(c)(2) 
 
in the case of a defendant who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a 
sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§] 994(o), upon motion 
of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau 
of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may 
reduce the term of imprisonment, after 
considering the factors set forth in section 
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if 
such a reduction is consistent with applicable 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.  
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 We must determine, as a threshold matter, whether 
Weatherspoon was eligible for relief under the statute.  Our 
review of this question is plenary.  
 
A. 
 
On appeal, the government asserts for the first time 
that § 3582(c)(2) only permits a defendant to file one motion 
for a sentence reduction and that the District Court thus 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Weatherspoon‘s second 
motion.  See Appellee‘s Br. at 23.  In the alternative, and also 
for the first time, the government argues that the Law of the 
Case Doctrine precludes review.  See Appellee‘s Br. at 24.  
Though we ordinarily consider issues not raised before the 
district court to be waived, see Brenner v. Local 514, United 
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 
1991), we have an independent duty to assure ourselves that 
we and the district court have jurisdiction.  Farina v. Nokia, 
Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 109-110 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, we will 
consider this argument only insofar as it implicates a district 
court‘s jurisdiction to adjudicate multiple § 3582(c)(2) 
motions.     
 
 In a recent line of cases the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that federal courts should be reluctant to classify a 
statutory requirement as jurisdictional.  See Animal Sci. 
Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510, 
511 (2006)).  Indeed, as only Congress may define a court‘s 
subject-matter jurisdiction, ―limits on the reach of federal 
statutes, even nontemporal ones, are only jurisdictional if 
Congress says so: when Congress does not rank a statutory 
limitation . . . as jurisdictional, courts should treat the 
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restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.‖ Bowles v. 
Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2368 (2007) (quoting Arbaugh, 546 
U.S. at 516) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
Several of our sister circuits have held that 
§ 3582(c)(2) does not permit a district court to reconsider its 
prior ruling on a § 3582(c)(2) motion.  See United States v. 
Randall, 666 F.3d 1238, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Redd, 630 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 
1997).  Some of these courts have done so because, while 
Congress did not specifically forbid successive motions, it did 
not specifically authorize them either.  See Redd, 630 F.3d at 
651; Goodwyn, 596 F.3d at 236.   
 
Though our sister courts may be right that such 
silence, when read in light of the statute‘s purpose of 
restricting a district court‘s authority to revisit a criminal 
sentence, means that a defendant is only entitled to one bite at 
the apple, it does not follow that this restriction goes to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.  After all, a 
rule derived from congressional silence does not support an 
inference that Congress has ―clearly stated‖ its intent to limit 
a district court‘s jurisdiction to one § 3582(c)(2) motion.  See 
Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2368; Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 654 F.3d 
at 468 (applying the Arbaugh ―clearly states‖ test).  Thus any 
restriction on the filing of successive § 3582(c)(2) motions is 
not a limitation on the district court‘s subject matter 
jurisdiction.   
 
Having assured ourselves that the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Weatherspoon‘s second 
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§ 3582(c)(2) motion, we will not further consider the 
government‘s arguments that Weatherspoon was barred from 
filing a second § 3582(c)(2) motion based on the same 
Guidelines amendment.  The government did not raise these 
arguments before the District Court and therefore they are 
waived.  Brenner, 927 F.2d at 1298.  
 
B. 
 
Our jurisdictional inquiry is not at an end, however.  A 
district court only has the authority to consider whether a 
defendant should receive a reduction in his sentence under 
§ 3582(c)(2) when the defendant has been: (1) sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 
been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission; 
and when such a reduction is (2) consistent with the 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); United States v. Doe, 
564 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2009).  Here, it is undisputed that 
Amendment 706 retroactively lowered Weatherspoon‘s 
Guidelines range and that reducing his sentence would be 
consistent with the Guidelines‘ policy statements.  Thus, the 
only issue before us is whether Weatherspoon‘s 120-month 
sentence was ―based on‖ his Guidelines range.   
 
Our resolution of this issue is controlled by the 
framework established by Justice Sotomayor‘s concurrence in 
Freeman v. United States.  See United States v. Thompson, 
682 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2012) (determining that Justice 
Sotomayor‘s concurrence is the narrowest opinion and thus 
controls).  In Freeman, the Court considered what a 
defendant‘s sentence was ―based on‖ for purposes of 18 
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U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) when that defendant pled guilty pursuant 
to a (C) plea agreement.   
 
To Justice Sotomayor, the sentence such a defendant 
receives is ―based on‖ the agreement itself, not on the district 
court‘s analysis or application of the sentencing Guidelines.  
Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2695.  This is so because, at the time 
of sentencing, ―[t]he court may only accept or reject the 
agreement, and if it chooses to accept it, at sentencing the 
court may only impose the term of imprisonment the 
agreement calls for.‖  Id.  Thus, any determination of whether 
a defendant‘s sentence is ―based on‖ the Guidelines turns 
solely on an examination of the four corners of the plea 
agreement.  Id. at 2698 n.2 (―[T]o determine whether a 
sentence imposed pursuant to a (C) plea agreement was 
‗based on‘ a Guidelines sentencing range, the reviewing court 
must necessarily look to the agreement itself.‖); United States 
v. Dixon, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 2913732, at *3 (7th Cir. July 
18, 2012) (―Under Justice Sotomayor‘s approach, a prisoner 
sentenced under a binding plea agreement is eligible for 
§ 3582(c)(2) relief only if the binding plea agreement itself 
expressly refers to and relies on a guideline sentencing 
range.‖).  Any statements made by the District Court, the 
probation department, or counsel are irrelevant to this 
analysis.    
 
Justice Sotomayor identified only two situations in 
which a defendant sentenced pursuant to a (C) plea agreement 
could be eligible for a sentence reduction.  Freeman, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2697-700; Dixon, 2012 WL 2913732, at *2.  First, 
when the defendant‘s agreement ―call[s] for the defendant to 
be sentenced within a particular Guideline[s] sentencing 
range,‖ ―there can be no doubt that the term of imprisonment 
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the court imposes is ‗based on‘ the agreed-upon sentencing 
range.‖  Freeman, 131 S. Ct.  at 2697.  Second, when the 
defendant‘s agreement ―provide[s] for a specific term of 
imprisonment—such as a number of months‖ the sentence is 
―based on‖ a Guidelines range when the agreement ―make[s] 
clear‖ that the foundation for the agreed-upon sentence was 
the Guidelines.  Id.  In other words: 
 
[a]s long as that sentencing range is evident 
from the agreement itself, for purposes of 
§ 3582(c)(2) the term of imprisonment imposed 
by the court in accordance with that agreement 
is ―based on‖ that range. Therefore, when a (C) 
agreement expressly uses a Guidelines 
sentencing range to establish the term of 
imprisonment, and that range is subsequently 
lowered by the Commission, the defendant is 
eligible for sentence reduction under 
§ 3582(c)(2). 
 
Id. at 2697-98 (emphasis added).   
 
Thus, to be eligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2), a defendant who agrees to a specific term of 
imprisonment in a (C) plea agreement must show that his 
agreement both identifies a Guidelines range and 
demonstrates a sufficient link between that range and the 
recommended sentence.  See id.; Dixon, 2012 WL 2913732, 
at *3.  Failure to meet either requirement is fatal to a 
defendant‘s § 3582(c)(2) motion. 
 
Applying this framework, Justice Sotomayor 
concluded that William Freeman fell into the second category 
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of defendants and was eligible for relief.  Freeman agreed to 
plead guilty to multiple cocaine base possession and 
distribution charges pursuant to a (C) plea agreement that 
specified that a 106-month sentence was appropriate.  The 
agreement stated that ―[b]oth parties have independently 
reviewed the Sentencing Guidelines applicable in this case 
and that Freeman agree[d] to have his sentence determined 
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines.‖ Id. at 2691 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  It also stated that his offense level 
was 19, ―as determined by the quantity of drugs and his 
acceptance of responsibility,‖ and that the parties anticipated 
that Freeman would be assigned a criminal history category 
of IV.  Id. at 2699.   
 
Because the agreement provided her with enough 
information to do so, Justice Sotomayor turned to the 
sentencing table in the Guidelines and determined that with 
an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of IV, 
Freeman‘s Guidelines range was 46 to 57 months.  She then 
compared this range to the agreed-upon 106-month sentence.  
Accounting for the 60-month mandatory minimum he faced 
on one of his other charges, Freeman was left with 46 months, 
exactly the bottom end of his Guidelines range.  Nothing in 
the agreement stated that the parties agreed to 46 months 
because it was the bottom of his Guidelines range.  However, 
because the figures corresponded exactly, ―it [was] evident 
that Freeman‘s agreement employed the 46-month figure at 
the bottom end of this sentence range, in combination with 
the 60-month mandatory minimum,‖ and that his sentence 
was ―based on‖ the Guidelines under § 3582(c)(2).  Id. at 
2700.   
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Justice Sotomayor also addressed Freeman‘s eligibility 
had he received a 53-month term of imprisonment, a sentence 
that did not precisely conform to one end of his Guidelines 
range.  See id. at 2700 n.9.  The analysis, she concluded, 
would remain the same: ―If the agreement itself made clear 
that the parties arrived at the 53-month term of imprisonment 
by determining the sentencing range applicable to Freeman‘s 
offense and then halving the 106-month figure at its low end, 
he would have been eligible under § 3582(c)(2).‖  Id. (citing 
United States v. Franklin, 600 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2010)).  
She also noted that ―if a (C) [plea] agreement does not 
contain any references to the Guidelines, . . . there is no way 
of knowing whether the agreement used a Guidelines 
sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment.‖  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
C. 
 
In this case, the parties agreed in the (C) plea 
agreement that Weatherspoon should receive a fixed sentence 
of 120 months‘ imprisonment.  Thus, Weatherspoon falls into 
Justice Sotomayor‘s second category — where the 
defendant‘s agreement calls for a specific term of 
imprisonment.  Confining our analysis solely to the four 
corners of the plea agreement, we conclude that the 
agreement does not ―make clear‖ that the foundation of his 
sentence was the Guidelines, because the agreement does not 
in any way identify or rely on Weatherspoon‘s Guidelines 
range.  In fact, the agreement is silent as to his range.  
Nowhere in the agreement does it explicitly state the range 
the parties relied upon in determining his sentence.  Nor does 
the agreement provide the necessary ingredients to calculate 
it.  The Guidelines range can only be derived from a 
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determination of a defendant‘s criminal history category and 
his offense level.  Here, we are missing at least one-half of 
the equation.  There are simply no statements or assertions of 
fact in the agreement that allow us to determine 
Weatherspoon‘s criminal history category.   
 
Because his agreement does not explicitly state his 
Guidelines range, or his offense level and criminal history 
category, and because Weatherspoon cannot otherwise 
demonstrate that his criminal history category is ―evident 
from the agreement itself,‖ we cannot conclude that the 
agreement identifies a Guidelines range.  Thus, his claim fails 
under Freeman and his motion was properly denied.  See 
United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 2012).   
 
Our approach finds support in the recent decisions of 
our sister circuits.  In United States v. Rivera-Martínez, 665 
F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2011), the First Circuit held that the 
defendant was not entitled to a reduction in his sentence 
under § 3582(c)(2).  The defendant had pled guilty pursuant 
to a (C) plea agreement that ―stipulated that the defendant 
was accountable for over 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.‖  Id. 
at 345.  After walking through adjustments to the Guidelines, 
the agreement specified that the defendant faced a total 
offense level of 37 but failed to mention anything about the 
defendant‘s criminal history category or his Guidelines range.  
Id. at 346.  The court held that the defendant was ineligible 
for relief because, without an identified criminal history 
category or range, ―[t]the integers needed to trigger the 
exception carved out by Justice Sotomayor [were] not 
present.‖  Id. at 349.  The Ninth Circuit came to a similar 
conclusion in United States v. Austin, 676 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 
2012).  It found § 3582(c)(2) relief unavailable to [the 
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defendant] because, even though the agreement noted his 
offense level, the ―plea agreement d[id] not contain any 
information about [the defendant‘s] criminal history 
category.‖ 676 F.3d at 930.  ―Without this information, 
Justice Sotomayor‘s sentence calculation exercise in Freeman 
. . . [was] impossible.‖  Id. at 929.  Thus, § 3582(c)(2) relief 
was unavailable.  Id.   
 
Indeed, ours is a clearer case than those before either 
the Ninth or First Circuits.  In both of those cases the 
agreements explicitly stated the defendants‘ total offense 
level but failed to mention their criminal history category.  
Austin, F.3d at 928; Rivera- Martínez, 665 F.3d at 346.  We 
lack even that information, as Weatherspoon‘s agreement 
makes no mention of his offense level.  Determining his 
Guidelines range from his plea agreement thus requires a 
particularly high degree of speculation, which runs contrary 
to the requirement that the Guidelines range must be clear 
from the agreement‘s face.  As such, his sentence was not 
―based on‖ the Guidelines and the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2).  
 
IV. 
 
 The District Court‘s denial of Weatherspoon‘s motion 
for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) will be affirmed.   
